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Introduction
Much has been written on African peasantries in genera! and on African "peasant wars"
in particular, and yet there is a remarkable gap in the existing literature. On the one
hand, we find inspiring works on peasant wars generally (Barrington Moore Jr 1966;
Eric Wolf 1973; J.C. Scott 1976; S.L. Popkin 1976), but the authors of these
theoretical and comparative studies ignore Africa south of the Sahara, with the
exception of J.M. Paige (1975) who devotes a chapter to Angola and a few pages to
Kenya (in which, as we will see, hè completely misinterprets the 1952-56 Mau Mau
rebellion). On the other hand, there are brilliant studies of specific African peasant
revolts and even a few attempts at generalizing on the Continental level (K.W. Grundy
1971; B. Davidson 1981), but none of these works have probed the material on African
cases in the light of the more genera! debates. This anomalous Situation, is what the
present article seeks to remedy, at least in part. "In part", because this essay is the first
result of a research project which is only in a half-way stage; the following remarks and
suggesü'ons should therefore be regarded as quite tentative. They wil! more particularly
address the rather tricky question of the revolutionary potential of different categories of
peasants, a question that has been of importance in the literature on peasant wars for
quite some time. This will be done by, first, presenting two general theories on the
revolutionary potential of different categories of peasants, and then discussing these
theories in the light of some African examples. Our conclusions, unfortunately, will be
rather negative: the general theories under discussion here are only of limited use for
understanding African peasant revolt.1
Two general theories
Basing themselves mainly on examples from European and Asian history, with some
additional evidence from Latin America, H. Alavi (1965) and E.R. Wolf (1973) have
elaborated a very interesting theory on "Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century", and
more particularly on the revolutionary potential of different sorts of peasants. Most
important is their distinction between rieh, poor and middle peasants, described by
Alavi in the following terms:
"The division of the peasantry into rieh peasants, middle peasants and poor
peasants suggests an array of the peasantry with the different strata arranged,
one over the other, in a single order. This is misleading; the middle peasants.
1I would like to thank Basil Davidson, Piet Leegwater, René Lemarchand, Henk Meilink and Terence
Ranger for their helpful comments on the first draft of this article.
forinstance, do not stand between the rieh peasants and the poor peasants;
they belong to a different sector of the rural economy. In the transitional
historical situations we shall deal with, a distinction may be made broadly
between three sectors of the rural economy. Firstly, we have the sector of
which the essential distinguishing feature is that the land is owned by landlords
who do not themselves undertake its cultivation. Their land is cultivated by
landless tenants, mostly share-cr'oppers, who are classed as poor peasants.
The second sector is that of independent small-holders, who own the land
which they cultivate themselves. They do not exploit the labour of others.
They are the middle peasants (...). The third sector is that of capitalist
farmers, who are described as rieh peasants who own substantial amounts of
land Their distinguishing characteristic is that their farming is based on the
exploitation of wage labour (...). Unlike landlords, they undertake the
business of farming on their own account and employ capital in it. The farm
labourers, who are paid a contractural wage, are referred to as the agricultural
Proletariat" (Alavi 1965:244).
Analyzing the revolutionary potential of these different sections of the peasantry, Alavi
comes to the following genera! conclusions:
"(...) the poor peasants are, initially, the least militant class of the peasantry
( .). There is a fundamental difference between the Situation of the poor
peasant and that of the industrial worker. The latter enjoys a relative anonymity
in his employment and job mobility which gives him much strength m
conducting the class struggle (...). In the case of the poor peasant the Situation
is much more difficult. He find himself and his family totally dependent upon
his master for his livelihood. When the pressure of population is great (...) no
great machinery of coercion is needed by the landlords to keep him down.
Economie competition suffices" (Alavi 1965: 274).
Alavi makes it clear, however, that the "backwardness" of the poor peasant is a relative,
not an absolute characteristic. When the poor peasant is shown in practice that the
power of his master can be irrevocably broken and when the possibility of an alternative
mode of existence becomes real to him, the poor peasant may fmally take the road to
revolution (Alavi 1965:275). On the other hand, the middle peasants, although initially
the most militant element of the peasantry, are limited in their social perspective by their
class position, and when the movement in the countryside advances to a revolutionary
stage they may move away from the revolutionary movement (Alavi 1965: 275). Of
course, rieh peasants and landlords, given their class position, will not easily commit
themselves to revolutionary adventures.
E.R. Wolf adopted Alavi's theses and added some further elements. He first of all
introduced the category of the "poor but free peasant", i.e. a peasantry located in a
peripheral arca outside the domains of landlord control, and claimed that these peasants,
like the middle peasants, do have some internal leverage (Wolf 1973: 291). He then
went on to say that:
"If we now follow out the hypothesis that it is the middle peasants and poor
but 'free1 peasants, not constrained by any power domain, which constitute the
pivotal groupings for peasant uprisings, then it follows that any factor which
serves to increase the latitude granted by that tactical mobility reinforces their
revolutionary potential. One of these factors is peripheral location with regard
to the center of state control (...). The tactical effectiveness of such areas is
strengthened still further if they contain defensible mountainous redoubts"
(Wolf 1973: 292-93).
Wolf concludes that:
"(...) ultimately, the decisive factor in making a peasant rebellion possible lies
in the relation of the peasantry to the field of power which surrounds it. A
rebellion cannot start from a Situation of complete impotence; the powerless are
easy victims" (Wolf 1973: 290).
Before turning now to a second general theory on the revolutionary potential of
different categories of peasants, a waming with regard to Wolfs ideas might be in
order, a waming phrased by R. Aya in the following words:
"To be most readily mobilized is not the same as being the 'most
revolutionary1 (...). If 'middle peasants', once mobilized, be revolutionary, it
is only because their parochial rebellions feed into a national cataclysm whose
outcome is an institutionalized order the peasants neither intend nor control
(...). But taken on their own terms, the aims of 'middle peasants1 have been
conservative, even reactionary, in the literal sense: to conserve the economie
and political basis of their identity, pride and meaning as a community and a
class within it - usually in deliberate action against ongoing currents of social
change" (Aya 1975:132).
Quite a different theory on the revolutionary potential of different categories of peasants
has been proposed by J.M. Paige. His ideas are not easy to summarize, but hè basically
formulates a theory of rural class conflict that tries to define:
"(...) recurring pattems of confict in terms of interaction between the economie
and politica! behaviour of cultivators and that of noncultivators and predicts the
circumstances under which these conflicts lead to cultivator social movements
in general and agrarian revolution in particular. The fundamental causal
variable in this theory is the relationship of both cultivators and noncultivators
(i.e. lower and upper classes R.B.) to the factors of agrarian production as
indicated by their principal source of income" (Paige 1975:10).
Given the fundamental causal variables chosen by Paige, four different agrarian class
Systems can be observed in practice, for each of which the author tries to define its
relationship to unrest and revolution on the basis of an essentially logica! and abstract
argument:
1. In the first case, both the upper and the lower agricultural classes draw their income
exclusively from land, a Situation characteristic of the commercial hacienda. On the
basis of a logical argument, which the limits imposed on this article do not allow me
to summarize, Paige concludes that in such situations "few rebellions of any kind
should take place", and that, where revolts (not revolutions!) do occur, they are
focused on "the control and distribution of property in land" (Paige 1975:42).
2. In the second case, the lower classes remain dependent on land, while the upper
class is dependent on commercial capital rather than land. This combination of
income sources is characteristic of a variety of smallholding Systems (incuding
middle peasantries R.B.) and leads to weak and dependent lower-class social
movements whose "target is likely to be the middlemen who constitute the effective
agricultural upper class" (Paige 1975: 47). Conflict may take political forms, but is
more likely to express itself in economie warfare over control of the commodity
market. According to Paige (1975: 48), the typical movement produced by this
combination of income sources for the upper and lower classes should be called a
reformist commodity movement. Focused on coltrol of the market in agricultural
commodities, it does not involve radical demands for the redistribution of property or
the overthrow of the state. It is moderate in its tactics and limited in its goals.
3. In the third case the upper class is dependent on capital, while the cultivators depend
on wages as their main source of income, a Situation characteristic ofplantation
agriculture. Such a combination of income sources produces a form-of political
conflict focused on income from property rather than ownership of property, and
strong working-class political organization with radical overtones. As the upper
class, however, is economically powerful enough to be able to bargain and make
concessions, the most likely outcome of conflict in such situations is a reformist
social movement focused on limited economie questions (Paige 1975:48-49).
4. In the fourth and last case, the upper class is dependent on land as its main source of
income, while the cultivators are mainly paid in wages. Accoiding to Paige (1975:
58), the typical form of social movement in these Systems dependent on landed
property and wage labour is revolutionary, and long guerilla wars will likely result.
None of the other combinations of income sources has this potential for revolutionary
war. This category, however, comprises two distinct forms of agricultural
organization, i.e. sharecropping sytems and landed estates dependent on migratory
wage labour.
"In sharecropping Systems the basis of group solidarity is economie class
status, and the corresponding revolutionary movements tend to be based on
socialist or Communist ideologies. In landed estate sytems dependent on
migratory wage labor the work force is only partly dependent on wages for its
support. Since it must return to subsistence agriculture for the off season, it
remains dependent on the traditional peasant or tribal village. When
revolutionary movements do form in such Systems, they are therefore likely to
combine both wage laborers and traditonal communal organizations. The
ideology uniting these disparate elements cannot be based on class but can be
based on national or racial hatred of a settler class" (Paige 1975: 59).
So much for Paige's logical argument developed in the first chapter of his book. In the
second chapter hè turns to the facts and considers the empirical relationship between
agricultural organization and rural social movements in a population of 135 export
sectors of 70 developing nations over the period 1948-1970. The analysis correlates the
dominant type of agricultural organization for each export sector with the number of
acts of rural protest observed in that sector, and leads Paige to the conclusion that the
overall pattern of results supports the genera! theory of rural social movements outlined
in his first chapter (Paige 1975: 120).
As for this second chapter, a few remarks seem appropriate. First of all, Paige only
considers agricultural export sectors, which means that he excludes not only
subsistence agriculture, but also commercial agriculture producing for the internal
market. As we will see later on, this has important consequences in so far äs he misses
several of the main (and certainly many of the minor) cases of rural protest in
developing countries during the 1948-1970 period. This flaw in his argument is
compounded by the inclusion in his population of only those export sectors that had a
certain importance within the overall economy of the country under study*. ^
 doing so,
he again misses important cases. Looking at the list of export sectors in Sub-Saharan
Africa used by Paige (1975: 378) one is struck, for example, by the absence of cotton
in Chad as well as in Mozambique, of groundnuts in Guinea-Bissau, oranges in South
Africa, and cloves in Zanzibar (and this list is certainly not exhaustive). In my opinion
export sectors are a far too limited field for studying agrarian unrest, and even if this
were not so, Paige's way of identifying and using them has several important
shortcomings and lacunae.
Secondly, the events of rural protest during the period under consideration have been
identified with the sole help of newspaper reports. This means, again, that some cases
are missing and, even more important, that Paige's interpretation of rural protest events
is based on sources that are not always the most reliable. To give just one telling
example: an interpretation of the Mau Mau revolt based on contemporary newspaper
reports (even papers so distinguished as The Times and The Guardian) would certainly
not satisfy those African and European historians who are working on this subject
today. More generally speatóng, revolutions are not always recognized as such by the
next day's newspapers and they are therefore insufficient for correlating agrarian class
Systems with different types of rural unrest.
In spite of these criticisms, Paige's theory is sufficienüy substantial and "logica!" to
deserve serious consideration, and more particularly to be compared with the
Alavi/Wolf hypotheses. It is quite evident, in fact, that the two theories contradict each
other on some important points. While Alavi and Wolf consider the middle peasants to
be the category that, initially, will be the most easily mobilized for revolutionär
endeavours, Paige holds that smallholder Systems (including middle peasantries) are
characterized by reformist social actions, while hè attributes much more revolutionary
Potential to sharecroppers who, in the terminology of Alavi and Wolf, are poor
peasants.
At another point, however, the two theories partly overlap. This is more particularly the
case with Paige's landed estates dependent on migratory wage labour, an agricultural
system that is not included, as such, in Alavi's agrarian sectors. The migrant labourers,
2
 For details on the criteria used, see Paige 1975: 74.
in fact, belong to two different agrarian sectors and play two different economie roles.
As migrant labourers they belong to what Alavi called the agricultural Proletariat, but at
home they are still peasants, and in most cases smallholders, i.e. middle peasants. The
question then is: is Paige right in viewing their Situation äs a specific and particular case
or can they be counted unreservedly äs belonging to the middle peasantry (or possibly
agricultural proletarians) as the Alavi/Wolf scheme would imply? To this and other
questions we will now try to find answers by using African data which have been
ignored by Alavi and Wolf and used (but sometimes misused) by Paige3.
Some African cases
Before we can try and see whether African examples of agrarian unrest tend to confirm
or to negate the hypotheses summarized above, an interesting preliminary question has
to be answered. Should one only use examples of "major" peasant wars, as was done
by Wolf4, or is it better to take into account a whole ränge of phenomena, from minor
disturbances like one-day demonstrations or strikes to the major wars, as was done by
Paige, and also by J.C. Jenkins (1982) when studying Russian peasant uprisings
during the period 1905-07? In the present stage of my research, I will have to opt for
the first solution which, at first sight, seems to be the most logica! way of proceeding.
How indeed can one compare the turmoil and upheavals of Chad's protracted civil war
with the peaceful demonstration of a few disgruntled peasants in an obscure provincial
market-town? Obviously, at least so it seems, these two "events" do not obey the same
rules and should not be used for purposes of comparison. And yet, on second
thoughts, doubts creep in. Major civil wars, too, usually start as minor disturbances of
the public order, and it can be argued that their metamorphosis from one stage to
another does not depend only on the revolutionary potential of the peasants involved but
also on other factors, amongst which, as is argued by C. Tilly, the reactions of the
incumbents take pride of place: "(...) collective violence is a contingent outcome of
interaction among contenders and governments, in which the agents of government
commonly have the greater discretion and do most of the injury and damage" (Tilly,
quoted in Berman 1976: 146)5. Wolfs Option of studying only major peasant wars is
•* A last caveat, before turning to the African examples, has to be introduced: in real life different
categories of peasants cannot be so neatly distinguished as sociological theory tends to suggest Often
there is some overlapping, as for example when independent middle peasants occasionally work as wage
labourers for other agriculturalists. This makes the interpretaüon of events of rural unrest all the more
diffïcult
4
 Wolf, in his major work (1973), uses the cases of Mexico, Russia, China, Cuba, Vietnam and
Algeria.
5
 This factor, although it certainly does not altogether invalidate all theories on the revolutionary
potential of different categories of peasants, does at least indicate one of their limits: a tough
government (or landlord) may provoke even the least militant peasants into action, while a more liberal
and tolerant System might be able to live in peace with a potendally very "revolutionary" peasantry; or,
therefore not the only possible approach, and I am aware that, by following his
example, i.e. by using the six cases of recent African peasant wars I am more or less
familiär with, my argument is not entirely watertight.
Coming now to my examples, we will first pay attention to Guinea-Bissau where, from
1963 till 1974, Amilcar Cabral's PAIGC fought an all-out liberation war against
Portuguese domination. This case is definitely in favour of Alavi and Wolf and runs
counter to Paige's argument. All sources agree that it was in the Balante areas that the
PAIGC won the most rapid and masive support during the war and, although in-depth
studies on Balante agriculture are lacking, there is no doubt that the Balante are
independent smallholders, in Paige's terms, or middle peasants in Wolfs terms.
Moreover, and here Paige gets even more entangled in his inconsistent way of
collecting data, the Balante rice growers in the areas that were the first to respond to the
call of the PAIGC were commercialising part of their crops on the interna! market, but
not for export, so that Paige omits this case in his general inventory of events of
agrarian unrest. This omission is all the more serious as commercial agriculture seems
to have played an important role in the recruitment patterns of the PAIGC. Using
unpublished research material collected by J. Cunningham, P. Chabal concludes that,
unlike the majority of cultivators in Guinea, the Balante rice growers in the regions that
were quiekest to follow the call of Cabral and his friends, "were forced to trade through
'concessionairs' and not through the official commercial centres. The concessionary
pontas (...) amounted to a monopoly control of trade in the area which was far more
unfavourable to the local rice growers than trading through official channels would have
been" (Chabal 1983: 69). Instead of a reformist commodity movement, as predicted by
Paige's theory, the Portuguese govemment, however, found itself face to face with a
full-scale nationalist revolution.
No need, therefore, to dweil much longer on this case, except to underline one
important point, i.e. that even middle peasants are by no means always spontaneously
revolutionary agents, as Amilcar Cabral himself admitted: "(...) nous savons (...)
d'expérience, combien il nous a couté de l'inciter ä la lutte (...). En Guinee, ä part
certaines zones et certains groupes qui nous ont fait, dés Ie début, un accueil favorable,
nous avons du (...) conquérir leur appui ä la suite d'efforts tenaces" (Cabral 1975:
143). This opinion was shared by Antonio Bana, one of the early PAIGC
propagandists, who claimed that the mobilization of the peasants, even the Balante, was
"far more diffïcult than the war itself' (Quoted in Davidson 1969: 55). Cabral and his
according to another possible argument, a tough government migh scare into inacüon and Submission
the most militant peasants, while a liberal and, particularly, more uncertain set of incumbents might
give ideas to any "underdog", in the absence of any immediate threat of retaliation.
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associates may have exaggerated their initial difficulties a litde (which all the more lend
credit to their final success), but there is no reason to doubt the essence of their
testimony: peasants are basicaUy suspicious people, even middle peasants.
As for the case of Mozambique, where Frelimo's struggle for independence lasted from
September 1964 till April 1974, much the same picture obtains as the one we sketched
for Guinea-Bissau. Here too, one ethnic group, the Makonde of the northern Cabo
Delgado District, took the lead in the war and remained Frelimo's main recruitment
reservoir throughout the struggle. In his case, too, we are dealing with middle peasants:
80% of Cabo Delgado's active population were non-salaried subsistence cultivators
(Munslow 1983: 95), and their activities in wartime and revolution are a genuine
argument in favour of the Alavi-Wolf hypotheses. Moreover, the data suggest that the
Cabo Delgado peasants, like their colleagues in neighbouring Niassa District, had more
"tactical power" than the peasants elsewhere in Mozambique:
"Tree social space' within which peasants and rural workers could plan
collective action undetected, existed or could be created more easily in both
districts. Because they were considered marginal backwater areas, the state
apparatus was appreciably weaker than in the more effectively policed southern
districts" (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983:67).
An interesting point to note here is that the leaders of the Mozambique African
Voluntary Cotton Society, who were among the first Makonde cultivators to join
Frelimo, although still basically middle peasants, were themselves relatively well-to-do
people, according to the evidence given by one of them (Cf. Mondlane 1969:134-135),
and may have been on their way to becoming real commercial farmers ("rieh peasants")
when the war caught up with them. But this certainly does not contradict Wolfs thesis.
The same holds for the fact that, during the 1950s and the early 1960s, many Makonde
worked as migrant labourers in Tanzania and as far north as Mombasa in Kenya,
forming an important basis for support to Frelimo during the struggle (Egerö 1987:
146). The special relations between middle peasants staying on the land and their sons
and daughters they send to work in town are an integral element in Wolfs theoretical
framework (1973: 292). The same fact, however, cannot be used as an argument in
favour of Paige, mainly because Frelimo's war broke out in the wrong place.
According to Paige's theoretical framework, such a nationalist revolution, had it
occurred, would have had as its theatre the Tanzanian sisal plantations, because these,
as an export sector, would form the relevant agrarian System, not the Makonde
countryside.
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A last point to be mentioned is that, like Guinea's Balante, the Makonde did not
spontaneously take up arms. Frelimo, first of all, sent some of its militants to Algeria
for military training, and it were these soldiers, and other propagandists, who mobilized
the local population and who initiated the war, at a date fixed by Frelimo (Mondlane
1969: 128-139). As in Guinea, these early propagandists experienced "peasant
scepticism", and the mobilization phase took nearly two years (Isaacman and Isaacman
1984: 141).
Another case that seems perfectly in accordance with Wolfs ideas takes us to
independent Chad which, from the end of 1965 till the beginning of the 1980s , has
been beset by a series of losely connected peasant revolts that gradually evolved into a
political-rnilitary organization (Frolinat) which, in its turn, tore apart the whole country,
brought down the incumbent (military!) government and finally took power in
N'Djamena6. Again, the Chadian peasants who, in this case spontaneously, rose in
rebellion before the establishment of an outside based political organization, are
defmitely middle peasants. Although many of them live in areas formerly, and still
formally, controlled by Moslim Sultans and Alifas, there is no question in North and
Central Chad of landlords, even less of "feudalism", as was the case in Ethiopia or in
some parts of Northern Nigeria.
Although not calling for any special comments as far as peasants are concerned, the
Chadian example is interesting in that it introduces a category neglected in most
comparative studies of peasant wars, i.e. the nomadic pastoralists. What is their
Position with regard to rebellion and revolt? One can first of all note that, providing one
reads cattle for land, most pastoralists do answer Alavi's definition of middle peasants,
in that they own their means of production and exploit them themselves, with the help
of members of their family but without using paid labour (Cf. Saul and Woods 1979:
105). At least this is the case of the Chadian Toubou who, although rather slow starters
in the Frolinat rebellion (their first actions only date from the beginning of 1968), have
been enthousiastic guerrilla fighters ever since and are largely responsible for the
rebellion's final victory. This is certainly not by accident. As I have demonstrated
elsewhere (Buijtenhuijs 1987: 87-90), the Toubou, by virtue of their traditional way of
life, are bom geurrilleros or, as Wolf would say, they possess an enormous amount of
tactical power and freedom. First of all, the vast desertie reaches of Chad's northem
BET préfecture are particularly well adapted to guerrilla warfare and, as was already
6
 Hissein Habré, Chad's currem President, starled his career as the leader of one of the main branchesof
Frolinat. He was the first guerrilla commander to overthrow an independent African government, to be
followed a few years later by Uganda's Museveni.
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noted by J. Chapelle, when analyzing the precolonial wars of the Toubou, they
themselves, in turn, are particularly weU adapted to their natura! environment:
"Leur résistance ä la fatigue et ä la soif est, en effet, extraordinaire et supérieure
ä ceUe de tous les autres nomades (...)• Les raids qu'ils accomplissent, avec
des provisions insignifiantes d'eau et de dattes, dépassent certainement les
exploits analogues des autres Sahariens, et ne sont limités que par la résistance
de leurs montures. A pied, ils sont imbattables" (Chapelle 1957:16-17).
This is not only a question of physical qualities and endurance. Their warlike spirit and
ttór traditional way of life, too, mark the Toubou as born guerrilleros. "La société
pe&soloniale toubou", writes C. Baroin,"(...) était une société guérrière (...). L'état de
feud y était quasi permanent" (Baroin 1985: 74). The same author also notes that in
traditional Toubou culture "l'agression d'autrui est normale (car ni Ie vol de bétail, ni Ie
meurtre ne sont pour les Toubou des actes en eux-mêmes repréhensibles)" (Baroin
1985: 91). It is therefore not surprising that, in Toubou society, "ä ses yeux, aux yeux
de sa femme, de ses enfants et des gens qui l'entourent, l'homme est 'homme' par Ie
port des armes et par son adresse ä les manier" (Chapelle 1957: 329). Chapelle, who
«smphasizes the bonds of affection that unite a Toubou man with his wife and children,
sfeo describes how a married man often leaves his "tent", in order to take care of his
fterds or to engage in trade or warfare, while his wife, in his absence, quite naturally
talces charge of the running of their camp. Thus:
"Malgré les obligations qu'il a envers sa familie et Ie sentiment de ses
responsabilités, l'homme se trouve entièrement libre. S'il quite sa tente, c'est
pour faire son métier d'homme, et une fois en route il suivra son inspiration ou
sa fantaisie. Ses voyages se prolongeront pendant des mois, sans que sa
femme s'inquiète de savoir oü il est ni ce qu'il fait" (Chapelle 1957: 290-291).
We can therefore conclude that the traditional way of life of a Toubou man is, in
important respects, quite compatible with that of a guerrillero, much more so than the
traditional way of life of a sedentary peasant (rieh, middle or poor). A Toubou man
enjoys an uncommon amount of "tactical power", and the question that arises is
whether this Situation is particular to the Toubou or whether other nomadic pastorialists
find themselves basically in the same Situation? The political upheavals that currently
plague the countries of the Hom of Africa, where pastoralists make up an important part
of the population, seem to indicate that we have here a very interesting field for further
13
Study, although one has to be very carcful in generalizing: the Bororo nomads of Niger,
bot who are also represented in Chad, never joined any guerrilla band.
Another interesting case with which I am somewhat familiär is the Malagasy
insurrection of 1947. Of all the examples analyzed here this case is the least well
doeumented, in spite of the excellent work done by J. Tronchon and R.B.
Ramanantsoa, and it is therefore not easy to come to any defïnite conclusions with
regard to the recruitment patterns of this rebellion. A few things, however, seem wel
established, First of all, although the insurrection was planned, in sofar as there was
auy planning at all, to involve the whole of Madagascar, not more than one sixth of the
istod's total surface (i.e., the central areas of the East coast) was finally affected by the
f$volt. As far as the existing literature permits any defïnite conclusions, these areas
were iahabited by middle peasants, which would seem to be an argument in favour of
Ae Alavi-Wolf hypotheses.
However, most other Malagasy cultivators seem to be middle peasants too, and it is
therefore of some interest to discover why only the East Coasters engaged in sustained
jfbellion? A first point to emphasize is that the dense mountainous forests of the East
ar« particularly favourable to guerrilla warf are, and that the secret societies that initiated
the armed revolt were well aware of this and may even have taken the conscious
decision to limit the insurrection to these areas. At least this is suggested by Tronchon
0974:108) who seems to forget, however, that, according to most of the sources, the
insurrection was definitely meant to erupt elsewhere, and more particularly in
Tananarive, the capita! town, where it was only cancelled at the last minute. Tronchon
siay therefore be mistaken on this point, but the restriction of the revolt to the East
coast, anyway, strengthens Wolfs remarks on the importance of defensible
mouatainous redoubts (Wolf 1973: 293).
toother feature is mentioned, however, by several authors. The East coast is, in fact,
also the area "where almost all the export crops were produced and where the
Maiagasys had suffered most from spoliation of land and requisitioning of labour"
(Thompson and Adloff 1965: 55). Intensive colonisation by people originating mainly
fk>m the neighbouring island of Réunion has indeed characterized the economy of the
areas involved in the rebellion, and these "petty colonists" have often benefitted from
tfaeir privileged politica! status in order to obtain more or less forced and certainly cheap
labour with the help of the colonial administration (Althabe 1969: 57-60). This point is
significant, because at least one of the secret societies that was at the basis of the revolt
had, according to the evidence given by one of its main leaders, as its goal: "de former
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^ jdéologiquement les jeunes, surtout les jeunes paysans des concessions coioniales, les
"' organiser et les entraïner ä la hitte politique" (Quoted in Ramanantsoa 1986: 61; my
äaMcs), while Tronchon, in his chapter "The price of war" claims that:
* "Le secteur Ie plus éprouvé est celui des exploitations agricoles, ce qui se
ï comprend quand on sait que la plupart des plantations européennes de la plaine
te oriëntale (...) ont été systématiquement soumises au pillage par les forces
^ malagasy. Rares sont les colons qui ont pu garder presque intacte leur
* '''
f
' propriété" (Tronchon 1974: 69).
* Although the data on the East coast estates are too scarce to allow any definite
conclusions, we have here very probably a case of a landed estates system dependent
oa ïaigrant labour that has produced exactly the kind of nationalist "revolution"
'•' predicted by the theory of Paige, although, ironically, Paige's crude ways of measuring
* ;sjpact of defining his initial population of export sectors made him miss this very
interesting case.
Il ifowever, Paige did not miss the case of Angola which hè uses as one of the main
* pieces of evidence in favour of his theory, and more particularly in order to demonstrate
|| Xjfcata landed estate system dependent on migratory labour is likely to lead to nationalist
{ revolution. Undoubtedly, hè has a strong argument here. The March 1961 insurrection
ƒ '"fët northem Angola involved an area where Portuguese coffee planters dominated the
-f ileal economy, where they were in conflict with a substantial class of African
;
 smallholders (of Bakongo and Mbundu origin), and where the substantial profits made
\ by ïhem during the boom years from 1950 to 1960 "were based on two aspects of
.. agricultural organization which were inextricably linked to colonial rule •• the forced
7 expropriation of native lands at h'ttle or no cost and the forced recruitment of African
^ labot»" (Paige 1975: 237). With regard to the last point, Paige specifies that in the
i aerifeern coffee regions virtually the entire population was affected by the demand for
estate labour (Paige 1975: 247), while contract labourers were also recruited from other
jpartS of Angola; in both cases, direct or indirect compulsion had to be used because the
jatevaiÜng wage rates were too low to attract sufficient numbers of workers (Paige
1975: 250). Paige, moreover, does not limit his analysis to this general picture of the
socio-economic conditions of northem Angola, but goes one step further by trying to
4 lest Ms hypotheses empirically by computing ecological correlations between measures
> of the coffee export economy and measures of revolutionary nationalist events for
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«oMcal sub-units within the area?. This exercise leads him to the conclusion that only
fa »as where settler estates were in direct competition with the local populaüon for
tod and labour were there any substantial numbers of nationalist events in the first
moaths of the uprising (Paige 1975: 269).
is no reason to doubt Paige's main argument on the Angolan insurrection, the
so since it has been confirmed by several specialists on ex-Portuguese Afnca
(Oiabal 1983:196; Pélissier 1978: 148).
1«S ïs not to say, however, that his treatment of the Angolan material is without fault.
The aiost important error is that Paige completely misses another "revolutionary" event
Aat oeeuned in Angola, in January 1961, i.e. a "very mysterious messianistic jaquene"
P»élissier 1978: 394) known as "Maria's war". J. Marcum supplies the followmg
details on this event:
"JfoBbte (...) broke out in the cotton-growing country of Kasanje (...). A fall in cotton
pte was foUowed by failure to pay African growers, then strikes, retaliatory beatings
aad arrests, and finaUy, by mid-February, mayhem and destruction throughout the
comitryside" (Marcum 1969:124).
Matcum qualifies this movement as a "religious crusade for 'independence'" and
wvesüs that the demonstrators sang militant hymns to Lumumba and to northern
Aagolan political leaders, but hè adds that later African nationalists described the
tnovement as "peaceful protest", because the arms of the rebels "were not used to attack
persons but only to level property and kill cattle" (Marcum 1969: 124-125). This
spoataneous and localized uprising, for which no Angolan nationalist movement
clataed credit and which was not publicized at the time, was harshly and rapidly
crashed by the Portuguese, so that there was no "follow up", contrary to the coffee
mms, where low-keyed guerrilla warfare led by a Zaïre-based nationalist movement
remained a reality until 1974.
Tltefartthat Paige never mentions the "Maria war" demonstrates that his argument is
«ttwateröght. First of all, why did hè miss this case? As it was not mentioned at all at
*e time in the press, one might suppose that Paige's exclusive use of newspapers as
Ms source for identifying revolutionary events must have played him tricks here. It
eertainy indicates the limitations of this method. Maria's war, however, as we have
7
 The data conceming revolutionary events are based on newspaper sources, supplemented by the
chronology of the 1961 uprising contained in Guerra em Angola by Helio Fergas, the former govemor
of the northern province of the Congo.
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Sien, is mentioned by Marcum, who is quoted at least once by Paige, so that the latter
eaaaot pretend to ignore what happened. This, then, leads us to another flaw in his
iKsoreöcal framework: for reasons that I do not widerstand, the Angolan cotton sector is
notincluded in Paige's üst of African export sectors (a. Paige 1975: 378), and this has
probably induced him to disregard Maria's war; a rather unsatisfactory solution that
casts doubts not only on his treatment of the specific case of Angola, but, again, also on
Sbfeneral treatment of "world pattems".
Bis true, however, that the northem Angolan case, as f ar as the UPA insurrection in the
coffee areas is concerned, does confirm Paige's theory, although, ironically, it cannot
fce used against the Alavi-Wolf hypotheses, as the local African cultivators who
jjartieipated in the revolt were middle peasants. Maria's war, however, is not consistent
<rê* what Paige would have us believe; technically, the Kasanje cotton growers were
rniddle peasants in that they still owned the land they were cultivating, and there is no
quesöon here of landed estates using migratory labour. However, when one reads
Pélissier's description of conditions in Kasanje, one wonders whether the term "middle
peasant" has any sense in this case:
"Un point ne prête plus ä discussion: la culture obligatoire du coton faisait de
rAfricain de la Baixa de Casange, qui y était soumis, un homme dont la vie
< dépendait de puissances économiques et administratives sur lesquelles il
n'avait certes pas la moindre influence, mais qui, en plus, par la répétition des
controles et des contraintes, Ie réduisait ä un état proche de la servitude"
(Pélissier 1978: 397-98).
IMs case seems to enter neither into the theoretical framework of Alavi and Wolf, nor
ia» Paige's theory.
Tataing now to my last case, the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya (1952-1956), I would like
first to make a preliminary remark with regard to Alavi's statement that the middle
peasants are initialty the most militant elements of the peasantry. What is exacüy meant
by mis? Does Alavi refer here to the first people to start organizing a protest movement,
even if they do not take up arms themselvest Or should we only take into account
people who actually initiate and participate in armed rebellion, when assessing the
«evolationary potential of different categories of peasants? As f ar as I have been able to
discover, neither Alavi nor Wolf answer this question and yet, as the case of the Mau
Ma« revolt will show us, the issue is not irrelevant.
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inte social composition of Mau Mau is an intricate question and some points are still the
tfjject of academie controversy (Cf. Buijtenhuijs 1982: 48 ff), but it can be said that
Itee groups contributed heavily to the Mau Mau forest arrnies:
'ftte Kikuyu squatters working on the European farms on the White Highlands.
„jlAlthough the extent of their contribution to the forest fighting may have been
»taggerated, they were certainly the initiators of the oathing movement that was later
to become Mau Mau (Cf . Furedi 1974).
- 2, A*obi urbanites, mainly Kikuyu, who were responsible for the radicalisation of the
;ótóWng campaigns in the early 1950s. Most of them had still one foot, if not two
test, ia the countryside, and although they were proletarians by class position, they
were peasants at heart, i.e. as f ar as their ideology and outlook was concerned.
J^pe Kikuyu Land Unit dwellers. Although this group did not initiale the oathing
,pmpaigns, it undoubtedly supplied the bulk of the forest fighters, once the war
i-dibfceout
first consider the squatters. There is no doubt that this category took the lead at
least twice in the political struggle of the Kikuyu people against colonial domination.
ffaiof all in 1946-47, when they transformed an existing "non-violent" political oath
Ümt was only administered to trusted (male) leaders by the then dominant Kikuyu
Central Association into a much more militant oath administered to whole communities,
women and children, in order to unite them irrevocably in the political
t second time, by the middle of 1951, when youth-wingers of the KCA in the
kareas initiated the batuni or fighting oath, to be administered only to a small
of selected militants who, by taking the oath, committed themselves to violent
icsu. action which, in the strict sense of the word, means that they were the real
as an armed revolt (Cf. Tamarkin 1976).
eoasider these people as the initiators of the Mau Mau revolt, then this example
gEKM@EßSt the Alavi-Wolf hypotheses. The squaters, indeed, held no rights in land
and worked as more or less permanent labourers on the European farms where they
wSfcpaid pattly in wages and partly by being permitted to cultivate a few acres of their
employer's land for their own use. As, according to an official report (East Africa
K0y&l Commission...: 167), only 25 per cent of their income was provided by money
wages and 75 per cent by the produce of their independent agricultural and pastoral
activMes, they may best be described as poor peasants rather than as agricultural
proletarians.
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•aeir protest, in fact, was mainly sparked off by the attempts of their European
employé« after World War n, to reduce them ftom would-be "independent producers"
»mtright'rural proletarians by severely linüting their access to agricultural and grazing
Throup 1987: Chapter V). Their early commitment to Mau Mau, then, cannot
ined by the views elaborated by Alavi andWolf. In spite of their limited tactical
s they were amongst the first to conspire against European rule, and they did
Ätieipate in considerable numbers in the forest fighting although, admittedly, such
prtteipation gained momentum only after they were more or less forcibly driven off the
WtóteHighlands during the first months of the Emergency. From that time on they had
pfcBiy of tactical fteedom and mobility, but in a rather unexpected way, i.e. in the sense
Ä« they had nothing to loose anymore, a point to which I will come back later.
mescpatters, however, cannot serve as an argument in favour of Paige's theory either.
m White Highlands, in fact, have all the characteristics of the hacienda System, and
Wge is completely wrong when he tries to use the Kenyan case as evidence for his
0sm views. In his book he gives a description of the Kenya coffee estates, an important
exjjort sector, which indeed corresponds to his criteria of landed estates dependent on
Mgratory labour, and then Jumps to the conclusion that this agricultural System must
teve been at the root of the Mau Mau revolt (Paige 1975: 68-69), which is entirely
incorrect. The Rift Valley squatters, not the migrant labourers on the coffee estates,
made Mau Mau, and Paige is here, again, a victim of his fixation on export agriculture.
E as I believe, the White Highlands correspond to the hacienda type of agricultural
Systems, then the Mau Mau revolt, according to Paige's theory should not have
occurred at all or it should have taken the form of agrarian revolt, not of a nationalist
revolution8.
Wil« aboat the Kikuyu Land Unit dwellers who, although late starters in the oathing
OKBpaigns, contributed an important number of fighters to the Mau Mau forest armies?
Maay of mem were middle peasants, but a more refined analysis of the data
éeajonsffates that Mau Mau recruited more particularly amongst the "poor peasants,
teoants and members of the junior lineages of mbari (sub-clans) in the Kikuyu reserves
wfco (...) were being transformed into a landless rural Proletariat as the senior lineages
attesipted to establish their exclusive access to land" (Throup 1987: 11). This, too, is
*Ä5SC familiär with the literature on Mau Mau might object here that Mau Mau had, in fact asmuch
I03fo with agrarian revolt as with nationalist revolution. Refering to hacienda Systems, Paige (1975:
42) dan» that: "When (...) revolts do occur, they are focused on just those issues specified by the
fteory - the control and distribution of property in land". Land played an important part in Mau Mau
ïdsotagy; therefore, Paige, although wrong on all the details, may still be pattly right as far as one of
his main arguments is concerned.
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theory and only of limited value for supporters of the
As4-Wolf hypotheses.
ÄSaal point has to be made with regard to Mau Mau, and more particularly with regard
' p the initiators of the armed uprising. As I have argued elsewhere (Cf. Buijtenhuijs
tfn>, when Governor Baring declared a State of Emergency, in October 1952, there
aiöot exist, neither in Kikuyuland nor on the White Highlands, a well-structured
i^lBtfottary organization ready and capable to initiale a genend insurrection and, apart
frora a smaU minority of young, uneducated semi-urbanites, nobody contemplated the
Ifeof violence in the short run. There simply did not exist a Mau Mau army and the
that gradually emerged in the Nyandarua and Mount Kenya forests owed its
more to the inconsiderate actions of the colonial government than anything
clsc:
:/,. " (...) as Government pressure mounted during the first few months of the
ƒ Imergency a growing stream of Kikuyu, Embu and Mem peasants began
* drifting into the bush or forested areas bordering their homes. This movement
%i was slow, sporadic and, at least in the early stages, unorganized. It was by and
terge a reaction to external stimuli rather than the unfolding of a well-laid plan
ßt for revolutionary action or guerilla warfare. In genend terms, this movement to
the forests might be described as a 'withdrawal', stimulated in the main by fear
of Government repressive measues and reprisals" (Barnett and Njama 1966:
: 149).
* •••ftmett's opimon is shared by Dedan Kimathi, the overall military leader of the Mau
'm- Maa Nywdaraa Army, who, in August 1953, wrote an Open Letter to the British
Authorities:
y.-.
"Because of the Government's policy of moving people without any
':• •''• eonsideration, and of harassing them in the Reserves many people have come
*% to the forest for fear of being killed orbadlybeaten. Asaresult, Mau Mau has
'f~ increased a thousand times" (Quoted in Maina wa Kiniyatta 1987: 57).
:l TMs brings us back to Tilly's remarks on violence often being initiated by the
'y- ifteumbems which, as I said before, casts some doubt on Wolfs speculations about the
•^L "teettcal powers" of middle peasants and poor but free peasants. Indeed several books
'yr'
* by ex-Man Mau fighters suggest, in accordance with the views expressed by Barnett
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DedaaKimathi, that many ordinary militants joined the armed struggle simply
tiuey had no other alternative. N. Kabiro is quite reprcsentative for these people:
"No one knew what the next day might bring or if hè would be alive to see it.
R» my part, I decided that it was time I joined the Mau Mau fighting forces;
Jife outside was becoming very hard to bear" (Kabiro 1973: 61).
"ïactical powers", then, seemed rather ümited, although it is true that hè could
otaed the Loyalist Home Guard at the time. I suspect that situations such as
here are relatively frequent and will occur on many occasions when the
government is the agent who first opts for violent action. Under such
neither poor nor middle peasants have much tactical power left, and their
a revolutionary movement does not necessarily demonstrate the instrinsic
potential of the category to which they belong.
l argument: the exit option
l - admittedly very tentative - conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analysis
rioajor African peasant wars? With regard to the theory of Paige, the results are
r aktive. At least three cases defy his predictions (Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique,
„.,„ Cfead), while the case of Mau Mau, as interpreted by him, does not fit either,
ÉÉough a more correct reading of the facts, as I have suggested, might eventually be
in Ws favour. Only one case (Angola) does fit into his model, while the example
^•Maaagascar probably does too. Two cases out of six seems a rather poor
performance for a theory that aims at, and pretends to have, predictive value. Yet, this
verdict might be a little bit too severe. The agrarian Systems that, according to Paige, are
Hkely t» give birth respectively to agrarian revolt and nationalist or communist
revolution are rather exceptional cases in Africa south of the Sahara, and the fact that
several of them have in fact been beset by intemal troubles should lead us not to
disclaim Paige's theory altogether, but rather to try to amend it by identifying where it
goes wrong and on which points it may be useful.
M for the Alavi-Wolf hypotheses, our African material seems, at first sight, to be much
Möte in favour of them. In all the six cases examined, middle peasants played an
important role, although, as we have seen, this statement has to be qualified for the case
-èfKeayft (where poor peasants were conspicuously present on the rebellious scène), as
," ^ eB as for the cases of Madagascar and Angola, where the rebellious middle peasants
at the same time migrant labourers, which, following Paige, leads us to the
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' däJ they rebel as middle peasants or as migrant labourers? Probably, the two
mies are inseparable, which means that Alavi and Wolfs hypotheses stand in the need
•f%^*
t or refinement.
AfflQther argument, moreover, can be used to cast some doubt on their line of reasoning.
QÉp»y to the agrarian Systems that, according to Paige, give rise to agrarian revolt
and nationalist or communist revolution, middle peasantries form the overwhelming
r of die agrarian Systems in Africa south of the Sahara9 ; instead of counting the
t ef cases favourable to the Alavi- Wolf hypotheses on the relatively low total of
t wais that have erupted in Africa south of the Sahara over the last decades, one
E Mater quote as evidence against them the fact that there have been, on the whole,
of agrarian unrest. Concerning the period up till 1959, for example,
that: "One of the outstanding facts about the past fifteen years of
: turmoil in subsaharan Africa is the infrequency with which Africans have
violence against their European rulers" (Levine 1959: 420). Although
i counts are incomplete (hè misses the cases of Madagascar and Cameroun) his
as are basically correct It is true that large-scale violence did break out, after
ta what remained of colonial Africa (Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique,
i and Namibia) but, for reasons which space does not allow me to develop,
i jfedod is rather a-typical. As for independent Africa, again, violence has been rather
K only two cases of major peasant wars (the Zaïre rebellions of 1964-65
i's armed insurrection in Chad) have occurred since independence, which is
^y low total. If the middle peasant hypothesis of Alavi and Wolf were true,
vMiid 0|* not have expected more cases of agrarian unrest?
V au objection might be made here. Over the last thirty years waves of
have engulfed important parts of Africa south of the Sahara, as is shown, for
by the fact that Africa has by far the largest number of refugees of all the
Much of this violence, however, has had to do with ethnic wars, attempts at
etc,, and one can doubt whether they should be counted as "peasant wars"
'ftdge, for example, made a clear decision when listing the acts of rural protest
ehapteron "World Patterns":
"Movements of regional secession have (...) been excluded from the analysis
if diere is clear evidence diat the movement is based on urban commercial or
industrial interest groups or if it involves a coalition between urban groups and
but the above statement is ceitainly correct generally
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upper classes. The American Civil War would not be considered a
social movement by this criteria, nor would the Nigerian civil war or the
secession"(Paigel975:91).
do agree with Paige's general remarks and also with his more specific
tö «feny to the cases of Biafra and Katanga the qualification of peasant wars.
, aowever, whether his remarks hold for all "movements of regional
at least as far as Africa south of the Sahara is concerned. At the grass-roots
a few of these movements are made up of peasants, and the question is,
eaeh specific case: Why do these peasants fight and in which capacity? As
» specific ethnic group or religion, as it would seem at first sight, or maybe
mainly, as peasants defending their rights to ancestral lands? In some
propostóon would seem to contain at least part of the answer. Analyzing
in the southern Senegalese region of Casamance, in the beginning of
. van der Klei argue that the immediate cause of the unrest
die question of tribal lands, and this more particularly because of the
to 1964, of the Loi sur Ie domaine national:
B jllnstallation des communautés rurales qui devaient gérer la terre en
cant les ainés du village, et la rumeur selon laquelle Ie gouvernement
ah des terres incultes ä des étrangers, renforcait chez les Diola l'idée
j|ijjÉ» te§ Nordistes étaient en train d'accaparer leurs terres" (Geschiere and van
'?a*Kki 1987:321-322).
•ty '
 r
jpBÖlors conclude, the revolt only became a reality "lorsque Ie gouvernement
tta effet ä s'occuper de la gestion de la terre" (Geschiere and van der Klei
, I do not think that the Diola case is unique, and one should therefore take
»t m least part of the examples of "ethnic" violence when testing the Alavi-
, I am thinking, more particularly, of the civil war in Southern Sudan
t revolts in Ethiopia.
it still remains true that many parts of Africa where middle peasants form
of the rural dwellers have remained remarkably calm since independence,
scems to indicate that middle peasants are certainly not always and under all
inclined to rebellion and revolt. How can one explain this? In a way by
same concept of "tactical freedom" which Wolf uses to explain why middle
are, initially, more easily inclined to follow the path of revolt and revolution.
Üneeéom, or tactical power, in fact, is a two-edged device. It does allow the
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„t fö opt more easily for disobedience and revolt than other groups of
Kit also leaves him the Option not the revolt, to have recource to other
; his discontent.
sjjarticularly clear when one introduces G. Hyden's well-known thesis on
af Africaa peasantry into the discussion. Hyden, in fact, argues that
% continent where the peasants have not yet been captured by other
i.e. made subordinate to the demands of such classes. By being the
r means of production, the smallholder peasants of Africa have enjoyed a
j from other social classes large enough to make them influence
^events on the continent:
j pessants are the owners of the means of production (...) and thus they
mys seek security in withdrawal (...). While it is true, as Francis Hill
„», that in the administrative regimes of contemporary Africa, peasants
e few opportunities to use citizen rights to circumvent bureaucratie power,
r do have the freedom to stay outside the state system. To use Hirschman's
Aogy, they have the Option to 'exit' out of the system" (Hyden 1980:
t has been severely critisized (Cf. Geschiere 1984) it is nevertheless
l peasants, although they do need the market, can afford, at least for
f |e do without the state. They can also "use the market against the state", by
l from cultivating crops that have become economically unattractive,
; some of the adverse consequences of government policies" ((Bates
s "exit" options are often less costiy for the peasant than open war, and
iaPsflent" guerrilla war (Hyden 1985:199), moreover, can be decided and
I individually without having recourse to collective action and organization,
s iiat are difficult to initiale for independent and scattered smallholders. In other
fand Alavi are right when they claim that middle peasants are free to revolt,
l'iebd to forget that they are also free not to revolt and to use instead Hyden's
. Quite a few African peasants seem to have made the latter choice, as is
by "Ie refus de l'arachide " in Senegal, cocoa smuggling in Ghana
•• 1986: 122-123), the failure of the ujamaa movement in Tanzania and of
at collective farming in Mozambique, to quote only a few examples.
; exit options do not only exist in the field of economics and politics, but also
JU field of religion. As I have demonstrated elsewhere (Buijtenhuijs 1976),
« churches and messianic movements are often used as ways of "libération
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dans l'imaginaire" (Althabe 1969), as an alternative to open revolt. Of this exit option,
too, African peasants have made extensive use.
Conclusion
The two theories on the revolutionary potential of different categories of peasants
| examined in this article seem logically coherent and intellectually satisfying. However,
when put to the test of materials on African peasant wars they are unable to account for
all the cases under study. Both theories may, up to a certain point, be correct on a very
general, abstract level, i.e. a revolutionary potential exists probably for several
categories of peasantries (middle peasants, migratory labour estates, share-cropping
Systems, and even hacienda estates), but this is tantamount to saying that the question
of revolutionary potential is not the question that really matters, i.e. that there does not
exist a revolutionary or militant class as such. I absolutely agree here with P. Worsley's
statement: "In sum, there is no single absolute general proposition that one can make
about any particular type of class, universally, as being the or even a revolutionary
force" (Worsley 1972: 227). More particularly, Worsley concluded that "no social class
is 'inherently' anything (...). Where they go depends on who approaches them and
how" (Worsley 1972: 223).
Different categories of peasants may initiale a revolt, under certain circumstances, or
may be mobilized by outsiders if the right arguments are used. A shrewd and informed
observer might, beforehand, have tipped the Kikuyu, or the Bamileke, as the possible
initiators of revolt in Kenya, respectively Cameroon, but who would have tipped the
Balante or the Makonde (in spite of their quality of middle peasants)? The revolutionary
potential is only one factor that plays a role in the making of "revolutions" and it will
only work when combined with a multitude of other factors, the identification of which
I will hopefully pursue in later publications.
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